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Recidivist Statutes As Arational

Punishment
MARKUS DIRK DUBBERt

Out of the debates over the Federal Omnibus Crime Act of
1994, there soon emerged a common denominator that united policy makers from all sides: the provision mandating life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for certain third felony offenders, also known as "three-strikes-and-you're-out."' 1 This
draconian recidivist provision, however, bore no relation to the rational ends of criminal justice policy. As commentators were quick
to point out, it would neither reduce the crime rate nor mete out
just and proportionate punishment.2
Surprisingly, the irrationality of the proposed recidivist law
was widely considered irrelevant. The more forthright among the
provision's proponents simply acknowledged its irrationality and
invoked its symbolic significance instead. The federal three-strikes
law, along with its many state analogues and the new federal and
state death penalty laws, were said to symbolize the legislatures'
resolve to address the problem of crime, presumably through rational policies to be devised some time in the future.
The new recidivist statutes therefore were not only irrational,
they joined the new death penalty laws as manifestations of the
current age of arational punishment. By arational punishment, I
mean the state's exercise of its punishment power without reference to rational constraints, as if in a rational vacuum. Irrational
punishment tries but fails to advance the legitimate goals of state
punishment; arational punishment doesn't even try.
Criminal justice policy in this country has taken an arational
turn as constraints on the state's exercise of its punishment power
have been suspended. The voting population shows no interest in
enforcing the limits of state punishment. The courts engage in
toothless rational basis review of criminal legislation. And legislators have been neither willing nor able to rationally reign in their
own might.
t

Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1. See Timothy Egan, A 3-Strike Law Shows It's Not as Simple as It Seems, N.Y.
TiMEs, Feb. 15, 1994, at Al.
2. See, e.g., Peter Pringle, Clinton Crime Bill Is a Sham, Say Critics, INDEPENDENT,
Mar. 10, 1994, at 14.
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Arational punishment has obvious drawbacks. By ignoring the
rational constraints on its punishment power, the state precludes
rational public debate about criminal justice policy, thereby discarding essential checks on the exercise of its most awesome power
and preventing the development of a considered public consensus
on the crucial issue of crime and punishment. Furthermore, the
state thereby undercuts its claim to the monopoly on legitimate
violence and its authority to inflict violence on its members in the
form of criminal punishment.
The current symbolic approach to crime and punishment is
problematic even if it finds wide support among the voting population. Insofar as it results in irrational criminal justice policies that
do nothing to advance the purposes of punishment, it violates constitutional constraints on state interference with the life plans of
its members. Insofar as it results in the mere shift to and containment of public and private violence in prisons and certain urban
minority communities, it is internally inconsistent and racially
discriminatory.
Death penalty opponents like to point out that the United
States stands alone among Western countries in its refusal to abolish capital punishment. The death penalty, however, is but one
manifestation of a more general anomaly. As extradition cases
from Canada to Europe illustrate, American criminal justice policy
as a whole, and not merely its dogged adherence to capital punishment, sticks out like a sore thumb.3 Criminal lawmaking in this
country not only metes out exceptionally severe penalties, but,
more troubling, it metes out exceptionally severe penalties without
considering their relation to the rational purposes of state
punishment.
In Part I, I outline the rational limitations that have been imposed on the state's power to punish since the enlightenment reforms of criminal punishment. I then demonstrate, in Part II, that
the new federal recidivist law and its state equivalents fail to meet
this minimum rationality requirement and therefore amount to irrational punishment. Here, I will pay particular attention to these
laws' supposed incapacitative function. In Part III, I argue that
these laws also constitute arational punishment.
3. See, e.g., Jamieson v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1994] R.J.Q. 2144 (Que. C.A.)
(no extradition because 20-year minimum sentence without possibility of parole for selling
10 ounces of cocaine "shocks the conscience"); Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 439 (1989) (no extradition because of customary delay in executing a death sentence,
the American "death row phenomenon" would subject the condemned "to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"); see also Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica, 4 All E.R. 769 (1993) (condemning "death row phenomenon").
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I. RATIONAL PUNISHMENT

The great theorists and reformers of the golden age of modern
criminal law from about 1750 to 1850 shared one goal: rationalize
the criminal law. On one side, Beccaria and his admirer Bentham
called for rational criminal law reform in the name of consequentialism. On the other, Kant and Hegel developed an account of
criminal punishment as the state's rational retributivist response
to crime. Bentham and Hegel disagreed violently about how criminal punishment was to reflect rational principles, with the former
arguing strenuously that any punishment that didn't seek to lower
the crime rate was unjustified and the latter maintaining just as
adamantly that any punishment that did nothing but aim to lower
the crime rate treated the offender like a dog. But all sides agreed
that the state's power to punish was to be grounded in and constrained by rationality. The state's function was to order its constituents' lives according to rational and universally recognized
principles, whether these principles all boiled down to the utilitarian calculus, as Bentham urged, or reflected the inherent structure
of Reason itself, as Hegel claimed.
No state institution required a more solid rational foundation
than the official infliction of violence on state members convicted
of crime. This is as true today as it was at the turn of the nineteenth century. First, the state's authority to order its constituents'
lives nowhere manifests itself more clearly than in the exercise of
its punishment power, the most intrusive interference in the life
plans of its members. Second, given the intrusive nature of criminal sanctions and the considerable political potential of the criminal law, a set of recognized functions and purposes of state punishment provides a rational framework for and, therefore, an
important check on the state's punishment power.
Third, strict adherence to rational constraints is particularly
crucial in matters of criminal law precisely because nowhere else is
the potential for unconsidered state responses greater or more
troubling. The criminal offender, and in particular the violent offender, directly challenge the authority and stability of the state
by openly defying its most solemn legal commands. No one mocks
the state's authority more blatantly or fundamentally than the target of the new recidivist laws, the habitual violent offender, who
repeatedly violates the most fundamental norms of the criminal
law and continuously ignores the strongest assertions of state authority. At the same time, the state's failure carefully to devise a
4. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS
Wood ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991).

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

§§ 83, 95 (Allen W.
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rational approach to the problem of recidivism dooms its efforts to
reduce crime since recidivists in general-and violent recidivists in
particular-contribute so heavily to actual and perceived rates of
crime.
Finally, the very legitimacy of state punishment rides on its
rationality. The irrational infliction of pain on citizens is no longer
punishment, but vengeance. It is precisely its rationality that helps
the state to distinguish its infliction of pain on criminal offenders
from the subjective vengeful violence perpetrated by the state's
constituents, whether it is the criminal's violence or the violence of
the lynch mob. As soon as the state's violence in the form of criminal punishment becomes the mirror image of private violence and
enters into a competition of violence with the criminal and the
lynch mob, it loses its justification.
State punishment that disregards its rational limitations turns
the state's punishment power against itself because it violates the
public norms embedded in the very criminal law it purports to enforce. Unjustified punishment for crime is itself a crime because
unjustified state violence violates the criminal law's norms against
illegitimate violence as does any other form of violence. As the
German criminal law scholar Karl Binding put it over a century
ago:
Whatever the punishment may be, whether it be against life or limb, exile,
prison or fine, its infliction is perspicuously an act that, whether it be homicide, false imprisonment, or the destruction of property, is generally prohibited and only permitted in exceptional cases. Apart from the concededly
very profound distinction between legality and illegality [Recht und Unrecht], the crime of false imprisonment and the punishment of imprisonment are closely related in content: legal rights of particular persons are
thereby destroyed or diminished.8

To say that the state holds the monopoly on legitimate violence is not to say that the state may always employ violence. Nor
is it to say that only the state may employ violence. The individual
who uses force against another, however, exposes herself to criminal liability unless she can invoke a principle of justification.7 So a
5. As one death penalty advocate put it recently, "soon as those persons stop executing

in the streets, we can stop executing in the prison system." Interview with Pam Linchner,
Founder, Justice for All, All Things Considered: Reinstatement of Capital Punishment

(PartI) (National Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 26, 1994), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR file.
6. Karl Binding, Das Problem der Strafe in der heutigen Wissenschaft, in 1
STRAFRECHT 61, 82 (Munich &
Leipzig 1915) (1877).
7. Absent extraordinary circumstances that mitigate the offender's individual guilt
STRAFRECHTLICHE UND STRAFPROZESSUALE ABHANDLUNGEN:
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soldier may claim that her use of force was justified because she
followed an order, unless the order itself was obviously unlawful. A
similar argument is available to the police officer who uses force to
execute a facially valid arrest warrant and to the bystander who
assists her. It is likewise a justificatory norm that shields parents,
teachers, and surgeons against criminal liability for the use of
physical force against children, students, and patients. Moreover,
all of us are justified in protecting ourselves, others, and our property against unlawful attack. We may even be justified in flooding
a solitary farm to save the village from the incoming sea.
The state's infliction of violence similarly requires justification, regardless of its form and target. For example, the public expects state officials to justify their decision to inflict the violence of
war on the members of their own state as well as on the members
of the enemy state. The adduced justification may then become the
subject of public debate, whose duration, extension, and force will
vary from state to state and from time to time. After the war, particularly if it ends in defeat, state officials may even find themselves struggling to justify their decision to wage war before a domestic, foreign, or international tribunal.
The state's infliction of violence on criminal offenders likewise
requires the invocation of a justificatory norm. In fact, since offenders, unlike enemies of war, tend to be members of our state
community (or at least are considered to be so for purposes of
criminal punishment),8 their violent treatment would seem to require justification with particular urgency.
Justificatory constraints on the state's power to inflict violence
arose from the enlightenment reformers' attempt to reconcile the
fact of state violence with the newly discovered equal dignity of
each and every human being as a rational agent." The solution to
this problem lay in the characteristic that united the state's constituents and reconciled them with the state's institutions: rationality. The state was grounded in rationality for the contractarians
because it represented, maintained, and enforced the agreement
among rational agents to surrender certain liberties in exchange for
other, more important, ones (or, in the language of utility, to accept the costs of communal cooperation in return for its greater
(excuses).
8. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 284-85 (1990) (Brennan, J.,

dissenting).
9. It may seem odd to associate retributivists like Hegel and Kant with consequentialist
enlightenment reformers. The point of this grouping, as of the entire discussion, is to high-

light similarities between rational approaches to crime and punishment, whether they be
retributive or consequentialist.
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benefits). The state was grounded in rationality for Hegel because
it, and only it, fully manifested Reason. Either way, the state's rational constituents saw their interests reflected in the state insofar
and only insofar as they saw the state as acting rationally.
By establishing a rational connection between crime and punishment, the enlightenment reformers could explain punishment as
being in the offender's rational interest. Bentham and other consequentialists devised intricate systems of specific and general deterrence that rationally linked penalty to offense on the basis of "scientific" principles of behavior (or, more accurately, of faculty)
modification, which were appropriated from the faculty psychology
of the day. Hegel similarly claimed that crime and punishment
were necessarily and rationally related because every criminal act
carried within it its punishment. Crime, according to Hegel, was a
negation of Right and hence an unstable concept which, for its resolution, required its negation in the form of punishment. Punishment, as the negation of a negation, in turn reaffirmed the stable
concept of Right.10
For Bentham, punishment advanced the offender's rational interest because it advanced the utility of the community of which
the offender was also a member. For Fichte, punishment was in the
offender's interest because it permitted her to reenter the community of rational agents bound by the social contract. According to
Fichte, she had excluded herself from the community of rational
persons by acting irrationally in violating the contract through her
crime. It would, after all, have been in her rational interest to
abide by the contract and thereby enjoy the superior benefits that
led to the contract's very establishment.
For Hegel, punishment was also the offender's right because
the offender, as a rational agent, must be presumed to have intended the application of the destructive norm governing her criminal act to all rational agents, including herself. Through the crime,
the offender therefore already had judged herself in the abstract.
The punishment itself merely carried out that self-judgment. According to Hegel, the jury verdict represented the offender's
indi12
rect self-judgment through members of her community.
Again, this is not to suggest that the proponents of various
versions of the rational state agreed on what amounted to rational
state action or even that they held a single notion of rationality.
Beccaria, for example, argued against the death penalty because no
10. HEGEL, supra note 4, §§ 93-100.
11. JOHANN G. FICHTE, GRUNDLAGEN DES NATURRECHTS NACH PRINZIPIEN DER WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE 253-56 (1960).
12. HEGEL, supra note 4, §§ 100, 220, 227, 228.
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rational being could have contracted to have her life extinguished,
no matter what she received in return. In sharp contrast, Kant accused Beccaria of "sympathetic sentimentality" and argued for the
death penalty on the ground that the very universality of the categorical imperative of practical reason required no less.,3 Whereas
the consequentialists rejected any concept of rationality that went
beyond the means-ends relationship between a particular act and
its utility, Hegel argued that the social contract society (or the utility community) was-strictly speaking-no state at all since it did
not reflect Reason but was held together merely by the formal
means-ends relationships characteristic not of Reason, but of the
Understanding.
What matters here is only that the state's conduct in general,
and the state's exercise of its awesome punishment power in particular, was merely to reflect the rational organization of a community of rational agents and was therefore strictly confined by rational goals and rational means, however defined. This universal
call for rationalization lay at the core of a criminal reform movement that managed to unify the disparate legal worlds of Continental Europe, Britain, and the United States. This reform in light
of rational principles led not only to a widespread reform of criminal laws but also to a general reform of penal treatment.
Before I turn to these reforms, I want to make clear that to
stress the invocation of rationality by reformers since the enlightenment is not to deny that, as Foucault and others have pointed
out, the reforms in fact merely shifted the locus of social control
from the body to the mind and from' the public to the private
sphere. Recognizing the rational aspirations (or pretensions) of reformers does nothing to preclude one from challenging either their
motives, their impact, or their reform proposals. On the contrary,
taking proponents of a given criminal justice policy by their rational word only makes possible a public discourse about the policy
they advocate. Regardless of their motivation or success, the enlightenment reformers deserve credit for enabling rational debate
about the goals and practices of state institutions; it is precisely
this debate that arational criminal justice policy renders
impossible.
As a final caveat, I should note that, by emphasizing the role
of common human rationality, I do not mean to suggest that other
conceptions of the person did not also play a role in the reconception of punishment during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. In the United States in particular, the religious concep13.

IMMANUEL KANT, RECHTSLEHRE

A202/B232 (Wilhelm Weischedel ed., 1956).
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tion of individuals as fellow divine creations and even the emerging
nationalist-republican conception of individuals as fellow Americans also figured prominently in the effort to reform criminal punishment in light of the newly awakened sensibilities of the "man of
feeling."14 At any rate, the American reformers of the period, along
with their European counterparts, urged the state to articulate a
purpose of punishment that respected the equal dignity of offenders and to reform its punishment practices so that they stood in a
rational relation to that purpose.
In fact, the debate about the ends and means of state punishment at the turn of the nineteenth century in the United States
provides an excellent example of the sort of public fundamental
dialogue about matters of criminal justice that is so sorely lacking
today. True, in the splintered society of the late twentieth century,
this dialogue could not draw to the same extent on the substantive
commonalities of religion or even of nationalism or republicanism
and instead would have to focus on formal commonalities, particularly the commonality of rationality. Nonetheless, the reform debates of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in the
United States as elsewhere, retain significance today. These debates identified the fundamental issues of modern criminal justice
and suggested and illustrated an approach to their solution,
namely the development of a public consensus on a rational arrangement of the institutions of state punishment based on the
conception of persons as equal rational agents.
Let us now turn to the two main targets of rational penal reform, corrections and codification. In the new field of corrections,
Americans led the way. As a French resident of Philadelphia noted
in 1796, "the attempt at an almost entire abolition of the punishment of death, and the substitution of a system of reason and justice, to that of bonds, ill-treatment, and arbitrary punishment, was
never made but in America.' 1 5 As early as 1776, Thomas Jefferson

had drafted a bill for the Virginia legislature that called for a punishment system based on the specific deterrent considerations suggested by Beccaria and developed by Bentham. The final two decades of the eighteenth century brought the establishment of
solitary confinement prisons first in Philadelphia and then in New
14. Louis P. MASUR, RITES OF ExECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATON OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1865, at 54, 63, 65, 67 (1989). On enlightenment sensibilities, see generally Karen Halttunen, Humanitarianismand the Pornographyof Pain in An-

glo-American Culture, 100 AM. HIsT. REv. 303 (1995).
15. ON THE PRISONS OF PHILADELPHIA 33 (1796) (quoted in MASUR, supra note 14, at
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York and other states, including Virginia. 6 These reforms, along
with the 1823 opening of the prison in Auburn, New York, helped17
inspire the rehabilitative movement in Continental Europe.
Alexis de Tocqueville was only one among many European visitors
to the new correctional institutions. 18- The first German prison
based on the Philadelphia model opened in 1848.19
After John Howard had exposed the horrendous state of prisons in England and on the Continent in the late 1770s, calls for the
rationalization and uniformization of punishment led to wide ranging reforms of the English prison system during the Victorian era,
culminating in the Prison Acts of the mid 1860s. 20 These prison
reforms sought to standardize the infliction of punishment based
on principles of specific deterrence and reformation, the modern
purposes of punishment propagated by Bentham and other utilitarian reformers. From early on, the English reformers, much like
their French and German counterparts, carefully monitored prison
reforms in the United States.2 '
The turn of the nineteenth century also witnessed major
codifications of substantive and procedural criminal law on the
Continent, including the influential new codes for Tuscany,2 2 Austria,23 Prussia,24 France, 25 and Bavaria. 26 In England, less compre-

hensive efforts were undertaken to rationalize and codify the criminal law and to curb the largely arbitrary discretion of common law
judges. For example, in 1833 a Commission on Criminal Law was
created, which was charged with making recommendations for di16. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN
THE NEW REPUBLIC 61 (1971); MASUR, supra note 14, at 84, 88.
17. On the German exponents of this movement, see Peter Landau, Die rechtsphilosophische BegrUndung der Besserungsstrafe: Karl Christian FriedrichKrause und

Karl David August Rbder, in

STRAFGERECHTIGKErr: FESTSCHRIFT FOR ARTHUR KAUFMANN

zuM 70. GEBURTSTAG 473 (Fritjof Haft et al. eds., 1993).

18. See GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SysTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE (1964) (1833).
19. See HINRICH ROPING, GRUNDR1, DER STRAFRECHTSGESCHICHTE 75 (2d ed. 1991); see
also GEHORSAMSTER BERICHT DER GEFXNGNI,6-COMMISSION, DEN BAU EINES ALLGEMEINEN
GEFXNGNIPGEBXUDES BETREFFEND (Frankfurt: Stockmar & Wagner 1840) (proposing construction of a prison in Frankfurt based on the Philadelphia model).
20. See MARTIN J. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING THE CRIMINAL: CULTURE, LAW, AND POLICY
IN ENGLAND, 1830-1914, at 60-67, 101-22, 277 (1990).
21. MASUR, supra note 14, at 87.
22. NEUES CRIMINALGESETZBUCH VON TOSKANA (1786) (Leopoldina) (Tuscany).
23. ALLGEMEINES GESETZBUCH OBER VERBRECHEN UND DERSELBEN BESTRAFUNG (1787)
(Josephina) (Aus.).
24. PREUpiSCHES ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT (1794); PREUftISCHE KRIMINALORDNUNG
(1805) (Prussia).
25. CODE D'INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE (1808) (Fr.); C. PRN. (1810) (Fr.).
26. BAYERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH (1813) (Bavaria).
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gesting and clarifying the convoluted common law of crimes. Although the English codification project was not completed, the
drive to rationalize the criminal law did result in the Criminal Law
Consolidation Acts of 1861 and Macaulay's Indian Penal Code of
1837.
Across the Atlantic, first Edward Livingston in Louisiana and
then David Dudley Field in New Yorl compiled state criminal
codes. 28 The first comprehensive effort to rationalize American
criminal legislation on a national scale, however, occurred not in
the nineteenth, but in the twentieth century. Calls for penal reform first appeared in the 1920s and increased throughout the
1930s.19 Within seven years after the end of World War II, the
American Law Institute had set up its Model Penal Code Project
under the direction of Herbert Wechsler. As early as 1956, six
years before the publication of the Official Draft of the Model Penal Code, Wisconsin revamped its criminal law based on early
drafts of the Code.3 0 Since then virtually every American legislature has reconsidered its criminal code in light of the Code's rational principles of coherence, legality, and the purposes of state
punishment, even if this reconsideration did not always result in
significant legislative revisions.
Take, for example, Congress's attempt in the 1970s to revamp
the spectacularly cluttered, anachronistic, and bloated federal
criminal code.3 1 In 1966, Congress established a National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws which was "to make recommendations for revision and recodification . . . , including the
repeal of unnecessary or undesirable statutes and such changes in
the penalty structure as [it] may feel will better serve the ends of
justice. 3 2 In 1971, the Commission published a Proposed New
Federal Criminal Code, along with three volumes of Working Papers totaling over 1700 pages.33
27. See WIENER, supra note 20, at 60-67, 101-22, 277.
28. See generally Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
323 (1978), reprinted in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAw 205 (1987).

29. See GERHARD O.W. MUELLER, CRIME, LAW AND THE SCHOLARS:
ARSHIP IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 151-64 (1969).

A HISTORY

OF SCHOL-

30. MUELLER, supra note 29, at 162.
31. See Robert H. Joost, Viewing the Sentencing Guidelines as a Product of the Federal Criminal Code Effort, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 118 (1994).
32. An Act to Establish a National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws,
Pub. L. No. 89-801, § 3, 80 Stat. 1516, 1516-17 (1966).

33. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS: A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1971); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,
WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS

(vols. 1-2 1970 & vol. 3 1971).
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After intermittent Congressional debate based on the Commission's proposals, the ambitious project of a new federal criminal
code ran out of steam in the early 1980s. Instead, Congress lowered
its sights and set out to revamp the federal sentencing system. In
1984, it set up the United States Sentencing Commission to "establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal
justice system that

. . .

assure the meeting of" the four purposes

of state punishment, retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation. 4 Congress further specified that in addition to the
guidelines reflecting the purposes of punishment, judges, in applying the guidelines to a particular case, "shall impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with" these
purposes. 5 In short, the imposition of state punishment was to be
restricted in two ways: first, by reflecting specific and generally acknowledged principles of punishment, and, second, by subjecting
the principles' application to the constraint of parsimony, a concept that lay at the heart of Bentham's punishment scheme and
that perhaps best reflects the enlightenment reformers' effort to
circumscribe the state's punishment power. 6
The Sentencing Commission, however, chose to devise a complex sentencing system that essentially codified past sentencing
practice instead of following the Congressional directive to draft a
punishment system in light of the purposes of state punishment.
Detached from the underlying principles of punishment, the federal sentencing guidelines reduced the imposition of punishment to
a cumbersome algorithm. As a result, sentencing arguments and
opinions do not focus on the purposes of punishment but on the
applicability of a given guidelines section, commentary, or policy
statement.3 7 Prosecutors' and public defenders' offices train experts in the intricacies of the guidelines and judges struggle
through the guideline thicket to avoid reversal. In the end, the
"guidelines expert," to whom all sides look for advise on particularly tricky guidelines questions, may very well turn out to be a
probation officer.38 The current sentencing guideline system, however, reflects the Sentencing Commission's failure to construct a
rational system of criminal punishment within the recognized constraints on state punishment, not the Congress's failure to recog34. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (1988).

35. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), (a)(2) (1988).
36. JEREMY BENTHAM,
182 (1948).

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION

37. See Gerald B. Tjoflat, The Untapped Potentialfor Judicial Discretion under the

Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Advice for Counsel, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 4.
38. This is the case, for example, in the Western District of New York.
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nize the importance of constructing such a system.
Aspirational, if not actual, rationality, then, has been considered an important element of legislative criminal lawmaking in the
United States since the late eighteenth century. To be sure, the
legislative codification and recodification of American criminal law
over the past two centuries has been slow and less than comprehensive. Still, opposition to codification and legislative reform in
Europe and the United States should not be confused with opposition to the rationalization of the state's punishment power.
Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the most articulate and influential
opponent of codification anywhere, whose authority was invoked
by nineteenth century codification opponents not only in Germany
but also in the United States and England, argued not against the
rationalization of law but against the method of rationalization
through legislation. 9 Instead of relying on the enlightenment philosophers' theories about Reason or the Nature of Man, Savigny
preferred to leave the rationalizing to the Roman law scholars, who
were to gradually adapt the law using the sophisticated conceptual
40
apparatus of the Roman law, as they had done for centuries.
In the United States, nineteenth century defenders of the traditionally unfetterea discretion of common law judges likewise did
not contest the value of rationalizing the law. Instead, they contrasted the universality of the common law with the provinciality
of American codification efforts, 41 and the "special qualifications"
of "a class of experts-lawyers and judges" to rationalize the law
with the short-sightedness and arbitrariness of "a numerous legislative body, disqualified by the nature of their duties for the dis'42
charge of this supreme function.
Moreover, even though the codification debate tended to be
framed as a debate about codification in general, it in fact was
mostly about the codification of commercial law. It is therefore
easy to miss the important point that even the most ardent opponents of codification, including Savigny 43 and, in the United
39. On Savigny's attitude toward codification and legislation, see Jan Schrder,
Savignys Spezialistendogma und die "soziologische" Jurisprudenz, 1976 Rechtstheorie 23,
26-27.

40.

FRIEDRICH C. VON SAVIGNY, 1 SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS

45 (1840).

41. Kadish, supra note 28, at 205, 230.
42. JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAW 5, 10, 87
(1884); see LAWRENCE M. FREDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 352 (1973) ("Carter and
Field. .. agreed about ends; disagreed about means.").
43. GUnter Haber, Probleme der Strafprozefigeschichte irn Vormnrz: Ein Beitrag zum

Rechtsdenken des aufsteigenden Bflrgertums, 91
SWISSENSCHAPT 590, 635 n.133 (1979).

ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHT-
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States, James Coolidge Carter," generally conceded the need for
the codification of the criminal law. Many of the most popular arguments against commercial codes simply did not apply to the codification of criminal law. For example, American opponents of codification often warned that a legislative code would interfere with
the ever evolving practices and needs of nineteenth century commerce by freezing the law at an arbitrary point in time. 45 The common law, by contrast, was praised for its ability rapidly to adapt to
changed circumstances. Its very flexibility, however, rendered the
common law unsuitable to criminal law, where the need for prospective, fixed, specific, and universally applicable provisions had
long been stressed by the enlightenment reformers and had even
found its way into the U.S. Constitution in the form of two
prohibitions of ex post facto legislation.46
Even the clamorous nineteenth century disputes over
who-legislators, law professors, common law judges, or some combination of the three-should rationalize the criminal law therefore
always presumed that criminal law must remain within the wide
but crucial bounds of rationality. And the same rational constraints have been held to apply to lawmaking by the voting population through plebiscite, such as the voter initiatives that recently
enacted "three-strikes" and "two-strikes" laws in Washington, California, and Georgia.47 Despite decades of debate about the countermajoritarian difficulty, it has never been doubted that the Constitution requires that any legislation, criminal and otherwise, find
a rational basis in the legitimate purposes of government.48
44. CARTER, supra note 42, at 17-18.

45. See, e.g.,

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO CONSIDER AND REPORT UPON

THE PRACTICABILITY AND EXPEDIENCY OF REDUCING TO A WRITTEN AND SYSTEMIC CODE THE

(cited in George M. Hezel, Comment,
The Influence of Bentham's Philosophy of Law on the Early Nineteenth Century Codification Movement in the United States, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 253, 262-63 (1972)); CARTER, supra

COMMON LAW OF MASSACHUSETTS 14 (Dec. 28, 1836)

note 42, at 15.

46. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; see also Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
47. Wash. Initiative Measure No. 593, ch. 1, § 1 (Nov. 2, 1993) (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.94A.392 (Supp. 1995)); Cal. Proposition 184 (Nov. 8, 1994) (codified at CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1995)); Ga. Amendment 2 (Nov. 8, 1994) (codified at GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-10-7 (Supp. 1995)); set Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290, 295 (1981) ("It is irrelevant that the voters rather than a legislative body enacted
[this law], because voters may no more violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot measure
than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation.") (emphasis added).

48. See generallyLouis J. Sirico, Jr., The Constitutionalityof the Initiativeand Referendum, 65 IowA L. REV. 637 (1980). Even Thayer, the grandfather of judicial restraint in
matters of constitutional law, assumed that courts would retain the authority to review the
rationality of legislation. Cf. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129 (1893). At any rate, the debate over the
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If anything, rational constraints are even more important for
ballot legislation than they are for ordinary legislation. In particular, it has been suggested that ballot legislation affecting minority
groups should be reviewed with greater judicial scrutiny than comparable non-ballot legislation. 49 This country, after all, has a history of racially discriminatory referenda, reaching from the antiblack initiatives in Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, and Oregon, which
excluded free blacks from these states and territories prior to the
Civil War, 50 to California's Proposition 187 in 1994, which denies
health services and education to illegal immigrants of any age.
Consider also the current popularity of anti-gay rights initiatives
from Colorado to Cincinnati. 1
Criminal lawmaking through plebiscite, however, is at least as
problematic as racially discriminatory rezoning through plebiscite.
First and most obvious, criminal law initiatives resemble racially
discriminatory initiatives because they are racially discriminatory.
Let us focus on two criminal law initiatives that have proven particularly popular with voters in recent years, namely those reinstating capital punishment or enacting harsh recidivist laws.5 2 Minorities are more likely to be subject to the death penalty or severe
recidivist penalties than are whites, whether this is so because
these penalties are administered discriminatorily or because minorities commit death eligible or predicate crimes relatively more
often than do whites.58
Criminal law initiatives not only disproportionately affect micountermajoritarian difficulty is about who should enforce the minimum constitutional limitations on positive law, not whether these limitations exist.
49. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial
Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 22-28 (1978); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990).
50. See EUGENE H. BERWANGER, THE FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY 85-93, 111-12 (1967);
LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES 1790-1860, at 69-72
(1961).

51. See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261
(6th Cir. 1995); Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092
(1995); Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Rule on Anti-Gay Rights Law in Colorado,
N.Y. TI Es, Feb. 22, 1995, at A17 (discussing a variety of anti-gay rights initiatives).
52. In addition to the Washington, California, and Georgia initiatives, supra note 47,
one should not forget the mother of all modern criminal law initiatives, California's Proposition 8, the infamous "Victims' Bill of Rights" of 1982, which introduced what was then the
harshest habitual offender statute in the country, the old CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West
Supp. 1983). See generally Markus D. Dubber, Note, The UnprincipledPunishment of Repeat Offenders: A Critique of California'sHabitual Criminal Statute, 43 STAN. L. REV. 193
(1990).
53. Which is not to say that the latter explanation may not also point to racial discrimination in the definition of death eligible and predicate crimes. See generally MICHAEL
TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 49-80 (1995).
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norities, they also reflect discriminatory attitudes toward crime
and criminals. The Willie-Hortonization of criminal justice in this
country has led many voters to think of the typical criminal offender, in particular the typical violent offender who would be subject to the death penalty or severe recidivist penalties, as a member of a racial minority. As the recent South Carolina case of the
white mother who claimed a black man had stolen her car with her
two young boys in the back seat and the 1989 Boston case of the
white husband who fabricated a story about a black gunman having killed his white pregnant wife illustrate, large segments of the
American public cling to the assumption that violent offenders are
black and male, no matter how outlandish the story of the purported white victims.4 A voter initiative has yet to impose harsher
penalties for crimes that are, and are perceived to be, committed
disproportionately by whites, such as business, official, and hate
crimes.
Even apart from their racially discriminatory impact and motivation, criminal law initiatives raise the very concerns that plague
more explicitly racial initiatives because they too affect a powerless
minority. Racial initiatives are problematic because they place an
ostracized minority at the mercy of an electorate unfettered by
whatever limited constraints public official debate continues to
place on representatives of the state. Criminal law initiatives are
problematic for the same reason. The millions of state members
convicted of crimes constitute the paradigmatic powerless minority. The object of universal condemnation, they are entirely at the
mercy of whoever makes the criminal law, whether legislators,
judges, or voters.
The point here is not to expose the unique problems of criminal law by initiative, but to highlight the minimum rationality requirements that restrict, all forms of criminal lawmaking. Death
penalty statutes or recidivist laws are no less racially discriminatory simply because they were enacted by the legislature and not
by the voters directly. Similarly, the problem of minority protection also appears in legislative criminal lawmaking, since convicted
offenders not only constitute a minority among the voting population but also have no representation in the legislature, nor lobbies
to influence legislators in the absence of direct representation. 5 As
54. See Rick Bragg, Police Say Woman Admits to Killings as Bodies of 2 Children Are
Found Inside Her Car, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 4, 1994, at Al (discussing the Smith case in South
Carolina); Constance L. Hays, Husband of Slain Boston Woman Becomes A Suspect, Then
a Suicide, N.Y. TImEs, Jan. 5, 1990, at Al (discussing the Stuart case in Boston).
55. Convicted felons generally lose the right to vote at least for the duration of their
sentence or parole. See, e.g., N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 5-106 (McKinney 1994); 42 U.S.C.
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Justice Stevens recently remarked: "There is obviously little legislative hay to be made in cultivating the multiple murderer vote." 6
In any society that values institutions based on rational principles emerging from public debate, an institution as pervasive and
intrusive as punishment calls for continuous reassessment in light
of its rational purpose. The radical rationalist codification zeal of a
Bentham or a Livingston may have long since evaporated in the
United States. The problem of justifying the state's infliction of
violence on its constituents, however, has remained. The vague
minimalist-individualist account of state authority that dominates
public discourse in the United States today only adds urgency to
this problem. If the state has no purpose other than to permit its
citizens to pursue their personal life plans without undue interference, what could possibly justify the state's direct interference
with the life plans of millions of its citizens by subjecting them to
painful punishment and even death? Surely a society concerned
with carefully circumscribing the state's power in general must
have a particular
interest in circumscribing the state's most awe57
some power.

II.

IRRATIONAL PUNISHMENT

Now that we have reminded ourselves of the minimum standard of rationality in criminal lawmaking, let us consider briefly
how the current recidivist statutes calling for mandatory life imprisonment for certain repeat offenders fare under this standard.
The federal three-strikes provision and many of its state counter§ 1973(gg)-6(g) (Supp. 1993).
56. California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 115 S. Ct. 1597, 1609 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
57. This simple but crucial insight drives the new republican criminology developed by
John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit. As Braithwaite and Pettit make clear, insofar as one
holds a minimalist conception of government and distrusts state authority in general, one
should endorse a minimalist policy on criminalization in particular. In fact, they argue that
anyone who claims to be concerned about crime rates first and foremost should disfavor
state punishment if only because, according to Braithwaite and Pettit, "crime rates are more
responsive to patterns of community disapproval of crime than to state enforcement patterns." John Braithwaite, Inequality and Republican Criminology 26 (Nov. 1991) (paper
presented at the American Society of Criminology meeting in San Francisco) (paper on file
with author); see generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHiLIP PETTrT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLIcAN THEORY OF CRBUNAL JUSTICE (1990). As a result, the new republican criminologists

advocate limiting both the scope and the intrusiveness of state criminal sanctions. For instance, they suggest strictly limiting imprisonment, which they recognize as a particularly
intrusive form of state intervention in the life of the offender, to cases in which reintegrative
shaming procedures, such as community accountability conferences between offenders and
their victims, are inappropriate. John Braithwaite & Philip Pettit, Republican Criminology
and Victim Advocacy, 28 LAW & Soc'y REV. 765, 773 (1994).
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parts fall into three components: sentence enhancements for repeat
offenders, mandatory sentencing, and life imprisonment without
parole. I will address each component in turn and measure it
against consequentialist and retributivist standards of minimum
rationality. In their compounded effect, these three components
render the federal recidivist law and its state analogues so indefensible as to amount to irrational exercises of state power.
A.

Recidivist Premiums

The current recidivist statutes can invoke none of the recognized retributivist or consequentialist justifications for punishment
either because the justification in question cannot support recidivist premiums in general or because the justification cannot support the current recidivist statutes in particular, or both. I will not
discuss possible rehabilitative considerations, because no one suggests that recidivist statutes make any sense, or, for that matter,
are meant to make any sense, from a rehabilitative standpoint.
Repeat offender laws have long been challenged by retributivists on the grounds that they penalize an offender's insufficient
obsequiousness and that they have nothing to do with the offender's present moral desert as they punish her not for the present act, but for another act already punished. A person who robs
another of $20 at gun point is no more blameworthy simply because she had five years earlier been convicted of burglary."" At
most, that person can be said to have ignored the state's admonition five years ago not to engage in certain criminal behavior. Considering that modern retributivism arose from a distrust of what
was perceived as rehabilitationism's affinity for hypocritical paternalism, it comes as a surprise that some desert theorists provide
even modest support for what amounts to a penalty for
recalcitrance.5 e
At any rate, even if one were to agree that retributivism does
not condemn all recidivist statutes, the current recidivist statutes
cannot claim retributivist support. First, many of the new recidivist statutes sweep so broadly that the sentence they mandate
often bears no relation to the moral desert of the offender. For example, the newest California recidivist law mandates an indetermi58. In fact, a repeat offender may be considered less culpable than a first offender because continued criminal activity despite prior warnings may indicate that subjective or objective factors outside of her control compromise her ability to refrain from that activity.
59. Some, like Andrew von Hirsch, prefer to think of the difference between the penalty
for a first and that for a third offender as a penalty reduction for first offenders rather than
as an enhancement for repeat offenders. ANDREw VON HuiscH, DOING JusEcE 85-86 (1976);
ANDREw VON HIRsCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRimEs 77-91 (1985).
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nate life sentence for anyone convicted of any third felony if that
person had previously been convicted of two serious or violent felonies. For starters, some thirty crimes and their corresponding attempts ranging from any felony with a dangerous weapon to robbery are considered violent or serious felonies under California
law."0 Add to that the recent trend, not only in California but
throughout American criminal law, of extending felony status to
ever and ever less serious conduct from spraying graffiti to shoplifting, and one ends up with some 500 crimes qualifying as a third
strike under California's new recidivist law. As a result, the California law has threatened with life imprisonment small time offenders like the jail inmate who got caught with eight ounces of
marijuana, the petty thief who stole $42.52 of hardware, the shoplifter who took sunglasses, a mustache trimmer, a birthday card,
and $75 worth of clothes, the robber who absconded with pepperoni pizza, the thief who stole a beer from a 7-Eleven, and on and
61

on.

Second, many of the current recidivist laws do not limit predicate convictions to prior convictions for acts committed after the
immediately preceding conviction. 2 Without this limitation, threestrikes laws will mandate life imprisonment even for an offender
who cannot be said to have twice defied the state's notice of punishment. Take, for example, a person who has just received her
third conviction but has defied the state's punitive notice only
once, either because she committed the act leading to the second
conviction before her first conviction or because she committed the
third act before her second conviction, or both. The notice argument would require that she be treated as a second offender, which
of course would bar the application of a three-strikes statute. Similarly, the notice rationale would preclude the application of a third
or second offense recidivist statute to an offender who has received
60. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c) (West Supp. 1995) (violent felonies); CAL. PENAL
§ 1192.7(c) (West Supp. 1995) (serious felonies); see also WASH. REv. CODE
§§ 9.94A.120(4), 9.94A.030(21) (West Supp. 1995) (predicate offenses include, among others,
all class A felonies and all class B felonies committed for sexual motivation).
61. Rene Lynch, "Three Strikes" Case Leniency Is Out in O.C., L.A. Tmms, Oct. 23,
1994, at A41; Marc Peyser & Donna Foote, Strike Three, You're Not Out, NEWswEEK, Aug.
29, 1994, at 53; see also People v. Superior Court, San Diego County, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364
(Ct. App. 1995) (reversing trial judge's dismissal of prior felony convictions to avoid application of three-strikes law to defendant convicted of possessing 0.13 grams of cocaine on the
ground that the courts have no authority to undo the clear intention of the California legislature to provide for life imprisonment even for a non-violent trivial third conviction).
62. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); see also N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-18-23 (Michie Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (1990 & Supp. 1995).
But see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (West Supp. 1995) (considering only convictions for acts committed after preceding conviction).
CODE
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three convictions but has never defied the state's notice of punishment because she committed the second and third acts prior to the
first conviction.
Third, again assuming the validity of the notice argument,
every repeat offender provision should exclude the consideration of
stale convictions. Whatever notice a conviction and punishment
may give an offender, its effect surely will dissipate at some point.
Three serious felonies in the course of fifty years do not make a life
of crime. Even adherents of the notice theory must acknowledge
the relevant distinction between an offender who has ignored two
prior convictions in the past year and the offender whose last conviction is twenty years old. The proposed laws generally do not exclude stale convictions.
Finally, enhancing a criminal penalty based on an unconstitutionally obtained prior conviction certainly would send the accused
entirely the wrong message. If she is guilty, a conviction process
that violates her constitutional rights will undermine the authority
of the state whose stern message she is supposed to heed. If she is
innocent, her respect for a railroading state obviously will suffer
even greater injury, further diminishing whatever moral force a
conviction by that state is said to have. If prior convictions have
such a devastating effect on an offender's life as the current repeat
offender laws ensure, these prior convictions must be reliable and
properly obtained. The integrity of our criminal justice system
would surely suffer were we to send persons to prison for life without any possibility of parole on the basis of unconstitutional or unreliable prior convictions. Laws that mandatorily increase a defendant's punishment to life imprisonment solely on the basis of
prior convictions, therefore, should explicitly provide for a process
by which that defendant can test the constitutionality and accuracy of these prior convictions." As a rule, the new recidivist statutes contain no such provision.
Life sentences for chronic offenders also find no support in
considerations of general deterrence.6 Aside from the fact that the
general deterrent effect of increasing penalty severity-as opposed
to the likelihood of conviction-has never been established, it
would be odd if increased penalties for repeat offenses should deter
just those offenders who make a career of crime and who have ignored the already severe punishments threatened for a first, and a
second, conviction of a serious felony. The very need for recidivist
63. Such an explicit authorization has become particularly important in light of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994), to restrict a defendant's opportunity~to attack the constitutionality of her prior convictions.
64. No mandatory life sentence can be supported on specific deterrence grounds.
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premiums suggests their failure. Sentences for first time offenders
are particularly harsh for precisely those offenders whom the current recidivist laws seek out, namely those convicted of serious or
violent crimes. If the threat of draconian penalties for a first and
second serious offense has failed to deter a given person from committing a serious crime, it is unlikely that the threat of a draconian
sanction for a third offense will do the trick.
Because judges already give great weight to prior convictions
in sentencing and because state and federal criminal law already
impose stiff sentences on serious offenders, recidivist or not, the
new repeat offender statutes will have the most severe effect on
small time offenders. Consider, for example, the case of Larry Lee
Fisher, who was recently convicted a second time for robbing a
store of less than $200 with nothing but a concealed finger he pretended was a gun. Since Fisher had been convicted earlier of second degree robbery, the new Washington recidivist law increased
his sentence from about 22 months to a mandatory
sentence of life
65
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
Moreover, there is some evidence that the hefty recidivist premium mandated by the new recidivist laws may encourage the violent behavior it is meant to deter. As police officers from states
with harsh and wide-ranging recidivist statutes report, an offender
who otherwise would not have intended to use violence may change
her mind and kill her victim, a police officer, or even a witness to
avoid apprehension and a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole."6 Law enforcement officials have raised similar
concerns about the effect of life imprisonment for recidivists on
prison crime, since "those inmates facing sentencing under the
three strikes' umbrella have nothing to lose. ' 67 This temptation to
use lethal force may become particularly strong in jurisdictions
which, in law or in fact, do not punish murder more severely than
they punish recidivism-either because they do not have a capital
punishment statute or because they carry out the death penalty so
infrequently and haphazardly as to deprive it of whatever marginal
deterrent effect it is said to possess.6 8
65. Egan, supra note 1, at Al.
66. Id.; Wendy Kaminer, Federal Offense, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1994, at 102-03.
67. Derrick DePledge, Virginia's No-Parole Law Raises Questions, SAN DIEoO UNIONTam., Dec. 11, 1994, at A42. This argument, of course, unintentionally calls into question
the propriety of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for any crime, see infra
text accompanying notes 92-95, if not that of imposing the maximum sentence provided by
law for any crime.
68. Cf. Jeffers v. Lewis, 38 F.3d 411, 425 (9th Cir. 1994) (Noonan, J., dissenting) (Arizona death penalty statute violates Eighth Amendment because Arizona has been unable to
carry out more than one death sentence since 1977). Even in states where the death penalty
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Life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for hardened violent recidivists, therefore, finds no support in rehabilitative, retributive or deterrent considerations. Their lack of rehabilitative, retributive or deterrent support, however, does not by itself
mark the current recidivist laws as irrational. After all, to the extent proponents of life imprisonment for repeat offenders attempt
to enunciate any policy rationale, they draw inspiration not from
rehabilitation, retribution, or deterrence, but from incapacitation.
A third time robber has proved herself to be a career robber who
will go right back to robbing upon her release from prison. Having
proved herself to be a chronic recidivist, so the argument continues, she must be incapacitated. Short of execution, mutilation, or
exile, she can only be incapacitated by locking her up for the rest
of her life.
Incapacitation, however, can no more provide the current recidivist laws with a rational justification than can rehabilitation,
deterrence, or retribution. Incapacitation as a proposed justification of state punishment suffers from several debilitating defects,
which the current recidivist statutes only magnify. First, incapacitation through imprisonment does not eliminate crime, it merely
shifts the locus of crime from one side of the prison wall to the
other. Precisely the crimes from which defendants are to be incapacitated by the current laws, namely violent crimes, are also the
crimes that inmates can and do commit in prison-unlike, say, insider trading.
Potential victims of prison crime include not only inmates but
also their guards and other prison employees such as doctors,
nurses, counselors, and chaplains. With over 1,500,000 prison inmates es and over 300,000 prison employees,7 0 the network of prisons in the United States houses and sustains a community the size
of the population of Nevada, Estonia, or Kuwait. Incapacitative
is sufficiently likely to be enforced to not render it prima facie irrelevant as a marginal
deterrent, prison inmates under no-parole life sentences would not be deterred from committing crimes short of murder, since even in those few states, assuming there are any, the
death penalty could not be invoked for crimes other than murder. See Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977).
69. This figure includes the over 400,000 inmates in local jails. Linnet Myers, Prison
PopulationIs Soaring in U.S.: Record Is Set, Surpassing Russia, CHI. Thm., Dec. 4, 1995,
at 3. In all, "[m]ore than 5.1 million Americans ... were under some form of correctional
supervision" in 1994, i.e., either in jail, in prison, on probation, or on parole. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. NCJ-156432, THE NATION'S CORRECTIONAL POPULATION Tops 5 MILLION (1995).
70. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE STATsTIcS-1993, at 94 (1994) [hereinafter SouRcEooK]. This figure does not include employees of local jails.
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imprisonment not only ignores the crimes committed against members of this vast community; it may increase it.7 1 Recently, a study
completed by California sheriff's captains found that the exacerbation of prison overcrowding resulting from the imposition of the
new California recidivist law "may
result in an increased number
'7 2
of assaults to inmates and staff.
Second, by warehousing offenders, incapacitation may result
in an immediate reduction of the crime rate but will fail to lower
the crime rate in the long run. Incapacitation works by definition,
and only by definition. Incapacitation assumes the incorrigibility of
offenders and denies that criminal punishment could have any
function other than the incapacitation of offenders during their
imprisonment (or after their execution or mutilation). Incapacitation lowers the crime rate by preventing inmates from committing
crimes on outsiders during their incarceration, not by preventing
ex-inmates from committing crimes after their release.
Incapacitation, therefore, renders correctional policy irrelevant. In an incapacitative system, it makes no difference what goes
on behind prison walls, as long as the violence and misery do not
spill out into the streets prior to an inmate's release. Given the
incapacitationist's assumption that offenders lack rehabilitative
potential, imprisonment has but one goal: keeping those inside
away from potential victims outside. Correctional expenses, therefore, are heavy on security and light on job training. As the few
remaining remedial programs whither away, so-called death fences
with lethal loads of 4,000 volts and 500 amperes are popular products supplied by the new growth industry of prison security
paraphernalia. 3
Third, criminology has yet to identify reliable indicators of future criminal activity. 4 The most ambitious effort in this regard,
by Peter Greenwood of RAND, turned out to suffer from debilitat71. It is of course not true that advocates of incapacitation consider prison crimes irrel-

evant as a general matter. In fact, the very incapacitationist who one day ignores prison
crime in stressing the incapacitative effect of incarceration may the next day vigorously support the death penalty on the ground that even lifers may commit crimes in prison. See, e.g.,
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (incapacitative justification of capital punishment
requires that a mentally retarded man without impulse control be executed because he
could attack nurses and others in prison).
72. DePledge, supra note 67, at A42; see also Michael Levy, Guards at Parley Stress
Danger of Prison Crowding, Buss. NEWS, Nov. 4, 1995, at A12.
73. Tony Perry, State Prison Preparesto Turn on Death Fence, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1993, at Al.
74. For a recent in-depth discussion of the serious criminological limitations of incapacitation, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT
AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME

211 (1994).

(1995). See also

WILLIAM SPELMAN, CRIMINAL INCAPACITATION
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ing methodological defects.7 5 Even if one were to assume that
Greenwood or others had succeeded in identifying a list of reliable
indicators of recidivism, constitutional and moral constraints
would cripple the list's predictive potential. For example, Greenwood's list of seven indicators included drug use and unemployment record, both of which are suspect because, insofar as they are
relevant to a defendant's culpability, they may exculpate, not inculpate and, at any rate, are conditions which may or may not be
attributable to a defendant's earlier culpable choice. 6
If the intense criminological research on recidivism indicators
over the past few decades has taught us anything, it is that the
nature of the crime of conviction and prior criminal record are
poor indicators of recidivism.77 This means that habitual offender
laws, which without exception predict future criminal behavior
based solely on these two unreliable indicators, lead to the unjustified prolonged incarceration of significant numbers of false positives, i.e., persons who, if released, would not commit further
crimes. By their very-nature, recidivist statutes often do not catch
up with an offender until after she no longer is in her crime
prime.7 8 Dangerousness predictions based on the seven Greenwood
factors generate a false positive rate of over 50 percent.7 9 Given the
crudeness of their recidivism indicators and their focus on violent
crimes, the current recidivist laws are likely to misidentify an even
higher percentage of defendants as career offenders; predictions of
violent criminal behavior are the most inaccurate of all recidivist
predictions and generate false positive rates of 60 percent and
above.80 This false positive problem obviously is compounded man75. William Spelman, The Depth of a Dangerous Temptation: Another Look at Selective Incapacitation (Feb. 1986) (unpublished manuscript), cited in PETER W. GREENWOOD &
SUSAN TURNER, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION REVISITED: WHY THE HIGH-RATE OFFENDERS ARE
HARD TO PREDICT 49 (1987).

76. PETER W. GREENWOOD & ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION 50 (1982)
(report prepared for U.S. Department of Justice).
77. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 152-55 (2d rev. ed. 1983); GREENWOOD &
ABRAHAMSE, supra note 76, at 47-61; JOAN PETERSILIA ET AL., CRIMINAL CAREERS OF HABITUAL
FELONS xiv (1978).
78. HANs-HEINRICH JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 803

nn.18-21 (4th ed. 1988);

REINHART MAURACH ET AL.,

2

STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINR TEIL 607-

08 (7th ed. 1989).
79. Jacqueline Cohen, Selective Incapacitation:An Assessment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV.
253, 270-71 (55%); Andrew von Hirsch & Don M. Gottfredson, Selective Incapacitation:
Some Queries About ResearchDesign and Equity, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 11, 21-

22 (1983-84) (56%); 1 CRIMINAL

CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS"

181 (A. Blumstein et. al.

eds., 1986).
80. JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECH-

NIQUES 73-80, 101-04 (1981).
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ifold in* the case of repeat offender laws that mandate life
imprisonment.
Moreover, even by its proponents' standards, incapacitation
only "works" (i.e., reduces the crime rate outside prison) if the
places of prison inmates on the street are not taken by an equal or
greater number of other offenders.8 1 The likelihood of an immediate and complete filling of vacancies is particularly great in organized crime. While it is unlikely that a murderer's place will be
taken by another murderer, a convicted drug dealer's job in the
neighborhood drug distribution network may very quickly be filled
by an eager replacement. Incapacitationist statutes enhancing penalties for repeat drug offenders, including the new federal recidivist
law,"2 therefore stand on particularly shaky criminological ground.
The unreliability of the present conviction and prior record as
indicators of future criminal activity will also result in the release
of many false negatives, i.e., persons who will commit offenses after
their release. Crimes these persons commit after their release from
prison will lead to calls for ever harsher repeat offender laws. For
this very reason, it could be foreseen that California's populace
would not be content with the extremely harsh repeat offender
provisions it adopted by initiative in 1982.83 Only twelve years
later, California triggered the current barrage of recidivist laws by
putting into effect what is generally considered to be the toughest
of the new recidivist statutes."4
Now that third serious felony offenders receive mandatory life
sentences, tomorrow second serious felony offenders may suffer the
same fate. The future has already arrived in Georgia, where just
such a provision recently became law.8 5 Forging ahead, we might
call for mandatory life sentences for third felony offenders, regardless of the seriousness of their past and present convictions, then
for second felony offenders, and so on. After Harmelin v. Michigan,8 which upheld a Michigan statute mandating a life sentence
without parole for simple possession of cocaine, Eighth Amendment proportionality presumably would not stand in the way of
these penalties. Before long, current proposals to impose capital
81. Another assumption incapacitationists must make is that prisons do not function as

schools in crime. This assumption is not relevant to the discussion about mandatory life
imprisonment for repeat offenders because these offenders would never again be in a position to exercise their newly-honed skills in the outside world.
82. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(c) (West Supp. 1995).
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); see also Dubber, supra note
52 (discussing adoption and harshness of section 667(a)).
84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(1), (e)(2) (West 1995).
85. GA. CODE

ANN.

§ 17-10-7(b)(2) (Supp. 1995).

86. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).

1995]

RECIDIVIST STATUTES

punishment on repeat
One can only wonder
will hold the line and
that only murder may

serious felony offenders may become law.17
whether, at that time, the Supreme Court
reaffirm its suggestion in Coker v. Georgia
be punished by death."'

B. Mandatory Sentencing
As commentators and judges have pointed out ever since the
adoption of the federal sentencing guidelines, judicial discretion in
sentencing is absolutely essential to the assessment of just penalties. In increasing numbers, federal and state judges refuse to apply mandatory sentencing laws. Often with the acquiescence of defense counsel and the prosecutor, they bend the rules to prevent
the imposition of a blatantly unjust sentence.8 " At times, judges
simply decide to defy the sentencing mandates altogether.9 0 In the
end, some judges see no other choice but to remove themselves
from all criminal cases or even to resign in protest.9 1
Although mandatory sentencing laws in general tend to sacrifice individual justice in the name of superficial uniformity, they
cannot be said to constitute irrational criminal justice policy if
only because they are ostensibly designed to further the goal of
uniform sentencing. The mandatory nature of the current recidivist laws, however, exacerbates their other, more serious, flaws. If
discretionary, an otherwise irrational criminal law might be
molded to reflect the goals and limits of state punishment in particular cases.
C.

Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole

In the United States, life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole has come to be regarded as a benign penalty, thanks in
no small part to the "death is different" campaign of opponents of
capital punishment. This campaign has won capital defendants
87. See, e.g., Brian Blomquist, CaningProposal Gains Momentum in Maryland, WASH.
TnMEs, Feb. 18, 1995, at A13 (discussing Oklahoma bill calling for capital punishment for
third time violent felonies).
88. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
89. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretionof Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1726 (1992); Leslie Wolf, Judge
Skips Prior Conviction in 3-Strikes Case, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., Dec. 2, 1994, at B1.
90. California Judge Refuses to Apply a Tough New Sentencing Law, N.Y. TamEs,
July 20, 1994, at A10; Morning Edition: California Judge Refuses to Enforce Three-Strikes
Law (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 8, 1994), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
NPR file; Peyser & Foote, supra note 61, at 53.
91. Lois G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY
SENTENCING

3-6, 122-23 (1994).
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certain additional protections, but only at the considerable cost of
lumping together all other penalties under the rubric of "non-capital" punishments, thereby effectively shielding incarceration from
constitutional scrutiny. However, as the German Constitutional
Court pointed out some years ago, life imprisonment without parole infringes upon the inmate's dignity as a person because it condemns her to a life without meaning and denies her fundamental
human potential to make a positive contribution to society. 2 As we
saw earlier, law enforcement officials also stress that inmates under
a life sentence without any possibility of release are particularly
likely to commit crimes in prison and to attempt escape because
they have no incentive to rehabilitate or to conform their conduct
to prison regulations or the criminal law.9 3 The British Cabinet recently rejected a proposal to impose life imprisonment without parole on 4the murderers of police and prison officers for this very
9
reason.

Life imprisonment without any possibility of parole, already
troublesome in its own right, helps exacerbate the irrationality of
the new mandatory recidivist laws. It adds insult to injury when an
inmate, falsely identified as a recidivist, must spend her life in
prison without even a chance of proving herself capable of a lawabiding and productive life outside prison walls. The "geriatric
clauses" in some of the new repeat offender laws merely permit
certain offenders to die outside prison after they have lost their
"recidivist potential" due to age and illness.9 At that time, however, they will be in no position to make any significant contribution to society, positive or negative.
III.

ARATIONAL PUNISHMENT

What is most troubling about the new recidivist statutes, however, is not that they fail to advance any of the rational goals of
criminal punishment. It is that their irrationality was considered
irrelevant. Instead of debating the statutes' consequentialist or retributivist purposes, policy makers celebrated their symbolic import. The new recidivist statutes thus became an exercise in arational, as well as in irrational, punishment.
Soon after the German legislature had adopted a compara-

iAN

92. 45 BVerfGE 187. Art. 102 of the German Basic Law prohibits capital punishment.
93. DePledge, supra note 67.
94. Alan Travis & Patrick Wintour, Life Sentence Plan Rebuffed by Cabinet, GUARD(London), Mar. 30, 1994, at 8.
95. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) (West 1985 & Supp. 1995).
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tively mild recidivist provision in the mid-1970s,9 s it became clear
that it did not stand in a rational means-ends relationship to the
legitimate goals of state punishment for much the same reasons as
those described in Part II." The recidivist section instead was
thought to retain only "symbolic and emotional" significance.9 8 As
a result, it was repealed as an illegitimate exercise of the state's
punishment power.
In the United States, recognition of the irrationality of the
new recidivist statutes has been similarly widespread. These laws
were said not to further the goals of state punishment, but to symbolize the state's commitment to further the goals of state punishment. In contrast to their German colleagues, however, American
legislators saw no reason why the merely symbolic significance of
the new three-strikes provisions should prevent their adoption. In
fact, "symbolic effect," when applied to American criminal justice
policy, is not a term of censure, but one of approbation."" Moreover, as the recent wave of recidivist and capital punishment laws
demonstrates, the harsher a proposed measure is, the heavier the
reliance on symbolic justification is likely to be.
Consider, for example, how Senators Biden and Hatch, cosponsors of the Senate version of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill, addressed the problem that the bill's recidivist provision would have
a negligible effect because existing federal law already provided for
stiff sentences on serious repeat offenders. In particular, the federal sentencing guidelines impose very harsh sentences on the socalled "career offender" or "three-time loser," i.e., a person con96. StGB § 48 (repealed 1986)(F.R.G.). Section 48 imposed a mandatory minimum punishment of six months on an offender who (1) had been twice convicted of an intentional
crime, (2) had served a prison term of at least three months on any or both of these convic-

tions, and (3) had not taken the two prior convictions as a warning. The provision disregarded any act committed more than five years before the following act.
97. See, e.g., Leipziger Kommentar (Hirsch), § 48 Rdnr. 1 (10th ed.); Ernst-Walter
Hanack, Zur Problematik einer Sonderstrafe filr RtIckfalltiiter, in PROGRAMM FOR EIN
NEUES STRAFGESETZBUCH: DER ALTERNATIV-ENTWURF DER STRAFRECHTSLEHRER 100, 102
(Jflrgen Baumann ed., 1968); see also JFSCHECK, supra note 78, at 802 n.15, 803 nn.18-21;
Dieter D6lling, Das Dreiundzwanzigste Strafrechtsiinderungsgesetz-Strafaussetzungzur
Bewiihrung, 1987 NEuE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1041, 1045 & n.78; MAURACH ET AL.,
supra note 78, at 607-08; Karl-Heinz Groft, Zum Entwurf eines... Strafrechtsanderung-

sgesetzes, 1985

STRAFVERTEIDGER

81, 81.

98. Groft, supra note 97, at 81; D6lling, supra note 97, at 1045.
99. For a rare-and telling-example of a policy maker denying a charge of symbolism,
consider how a New Jersey state senator recently defended the state's new three-strikes law;
he explained that it "is not symbolism [because] [e]ighty-eight percent of the people in polls
are absolutely in favor of this." Iver Peterson, Bills on Crime: Meeting the Demands, N.Y.
Tszs, Apr. 11, 1995, at B5 (quoting Senator Louis Kosco).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

victed of a third violent or drug-related offense.100 Furthermore,
prior convictions under the federal guidelines determine an offender's criminal history category and therefore increase the
sentences even for offenders who do not qualify as career
offenders. 101
The states have also had severe recidivist laws on the books
for decades. As was noted earlier, the California Penal Code contained several harsh repeat offender statutes long before the passage of the latest mandatory life provision. 1 02 Since the late nineteenth century, state recidivist statutes have been strict enough to
have repeatedly tested the Supreme Court's willingness to give
content to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and to sundry other constitutional
protections. 03
Asked to comment on the U.S. Sentencing Commission's estimate that the proposed federal recidivist provision would only affect a few hundred offenders,0 4 Senators Biden and Hatch suggested that the provision was not quite intended to advance the
rational goals of state punishment but was meant as a symbol of
the Congress's resolve to address the nation's crime problem.105 According to Biden, the dozens of new capital crimes in the federal
crime bill also fulfilled merely a symbolic function, because only a
handful of offenders would in fact face execution for a federal
crime.10 6 As a former Texas gubernatorial candidate put it re100. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL

§

4B1.1 (Nov. 1994) [hereinafter

U.S.S.G.] (career offender); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1993) (mandatory life in
prison for third drug conviction); for judicial use of the term "three-time loser," see United
States v. Rice, 43 F.3d 601, 606 (11th Cir. 1995).
101. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1.
102. See Dubber, supra note 52.
103. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (Eighth Amendment challenge);
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (same); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (same);
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967) (non-Eighth Amendment challenge); Oyler v. Boles,
368 U.S. 448 (1962) (same); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (same); Graham v. West
Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912) (Eighth Amendment challenge, among others); McDonald v.
Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901) (same); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895) (nonEighth Amendment challenge).
104. United States Sentencing Commission, Impact of Mandatory Life Imprisonment
for Three-Time Losers (1994) (memorandum on file with author); see also Meet the Press,
(NBC television broadcast, Apr. 17, 1994), at 10-11 (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Meet the Press].
105. Meet the Press, supra note 104, at 11.
106. Neil A. Lewis, A New and Expanded Death Penalty Measure, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug.
15, 1993, at D4; cf. Barbara Ann Stolz, Congress and Capital Punishment: An Exercise in
Symbolic Politics, 5 LAw & POL'Y Q. 157, 165 (1983) (suggesting, in 1983, that federal death
penalty legislation aims at "reassuring [the public] that the federal government is responding to their fear of crime"). Considering the recent affirmance of the first death sentence

RECIDIVIST STATUTES

1995]

is a useful symbol that says to voters
cently: "capital punishment
107
I'm serious about crime."
Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins have suggested that
the American public may support the death penalty not for retributive, deterrent, or incapacitative reasons, but as a symbol of "governmental willingness to employ ultimate power against those who
threaten collective moral order.' 1 08 Commenting on the passage of
the 1994 Federal Crime Bill, Zimring recently pointed out that
"'[t]o talk about its efficacy is to miss the point.... It is far more
important as a symbolic denunciation and expression of concern
than as a serious crime counter-measure.' "10
It can hardly be denied that crime and punishment have
played an important symbolic role for millennia and will continue
to do so in the future. Joel Feinberg has analyzed the moral condemnatory function of criminal sanctions. 1 0 Sociologists of law
since Durkheim similarly have exposed the symbolic significance of
criminal punishment practices, regardless whether the symbols of
state punishment reflect or affect some conscience collective, or
both."'
imposed under the 1988 federal drug kingpin statute and the popularity of that statute with
federal prosecutors throughout the country, Biden probably underestimates the impact of
the new capital provisions. See United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2724 (1994). As of April. 31, 1995, six federal prisoners and eight
military prisoners awaited execution. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC. FUND, DEATH Row
U.S.A. REP. 773, 813 (Apr. 31, 1995).
107. Interview with Jim Maddox, All Things Considered. Reinstatement of Capital
Punishment (Part I) (National Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 26, 1994), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR file.
108.

FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERI-

14-17 (1986); see also Phoebe Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 116, 164-65 (1983) (public attitudes toward capital
punishment are "(or appear to be) expressive rather than instrumental" and "almost wholly
abstract, ideological, and symbolic in nature, with essentially no personal relevance to the
individual."); HUGO A. BEDAU, DEATH Is DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, LAW, AND
CAN AGENDA

POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

246 (1987).

109. Neil A. Lewis, PresidentForesees Safer U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1994, at A6.
110. Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Functionof Punishment,49-3 MONIST (July 1965),
reprintedin DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSmILITY 95 (1970); see
also R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS (1986) (analyzing expressive function of punishment, but justifying actual punishment on communicative grounds); BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT,
supra note 57 (stressing importance of symbolic condemnation in crime control and of symbols of community disapproval other than state intervention); cf. MORRIS R. COHEN, REASON
AND LAW 50 (1950) (justifying criminal punishment as moral condemnation).
111. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson
trans., 1933);

DAVID GARLAND,

PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SocIAL THE-

(1990); David Garland, Punishmentand Culture: The Symbolic Dimension of Criminal
Justice, 11 STUD. L., POL., & Soc'Y 191 (1991). For an interesting discussion of the significance of symbols in the specific context of federal criminal lawmaking, see Stolz, supra note
ORY
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Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish between description
and justification, i.e., between observations about the actual sociological function of criminal punishment, on the one hand, and prescriptive rational constraints on the state's power to punish, on the
other. The hypothesis that the public endorses capital punishment
as a symbol, not as a crime fighting device or a manifestation of
retributive equivalence between crime and punishment, attempts
to explain why the public appears to be far more enthusiastic
about the threat of capital punishment than about its execution.
As the committed abolitionists Zimring and Hawkins would readily
acknowledge, however, to speculate about the attitudes toward
crime and punishment reflected in a given criminal justice policy is
not to justify that policy.
The state may engage in all sorts of symbolic action, even to
signal-to potential offenders and victims alike-its commitment
to making use of its punishment power, as long as that action remains entirely symbolic and does not amount to an actual exercise
of its punishment power. 11 2 But as soon as the state in fact exercises its awesome power to punish, i.e., as soon as it passes laws
that will expose any of its constituents to criminal punishment, the
state must justify its actions on the basis of the rational justifications of state punishment that have formed the most important
check on state power since the enlightenment.
Now, American policymakers do not stand alone in their disregard for the rational limitations on state punishment. Particularly
in the past two decades, American courts have shown no inclination to review criminal legislation for its rational basis.11 As a result, the legislature enjoys wide latitude in determining what conduct to criminalize, 114 how to punish it,11 and who decides how to

punish it, 6 as well as how to distinguish between criminal and
civil proceedings," 7 and between elements of a crime and sentenc106. See also Brian T. FitzPatrick, CongressionalRe-Election Through Symbolic Politics:
The Enhanced Banking Crime Penalties, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
112. See DUFF, supra note 110, at 241; Feinberg, supra note 110, at 101.
113. The recent decision striking down the federal statute criminalizing gun possession
in and around schools is no exception. It rested entirely on considerations of federalism.
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
114. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (oral sex).
115. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (mandatory life sentence for simple
possession of cocaine); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty). But see Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for rape unconstitutional).
116. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (sentencing commission).
117. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980). But see International Union,
United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994) (criminal contempt); Department of
Revenue of Mont. v. Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) (criminal tax penalty).
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ing factors.11 Even the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which drafts

sentencing guidelines under congressional delegation, can rest assured that its guidelines will escape meaningful rational basis review in the courts, even if they lead to bizarre results. Judge Richard Posner's dissent in a recent Seventh Circuit en banc case
upholding the federal sentencing guideline for LSD possession is
highly unusual, not merely because Posner found the guideline irrational, but also because he took the trouble of taking a serious
look at the guideline's rationality in the first place. 119
In the absence of judicial supervision, legislators have not
taken it upon themselves to uphold minimum standards of rationality, as Thayer might have hoped. 12 0 Nor has their disregard for
the constricting principles of purposeful criminal justice policy encountered opposition among the voting public. On the contrary,
voters continue to support arational criminal justice policies and,
in certain states, even make the policies themselves through voter
initiatives.
Arational punitive attitudes, however, are no less troubling if
they are the public's than if they are the legislator's (or the
judge's). In particular, the current symbolic attitude toward crime
and punishment among significant segments of the American voting population cannot legitimize the state's infliction of violence in
the name of punishment because it is irrational, internally inconsistent and racially discriminatory.
All arational attitudes toward punishment are also irrational
insofar as they result in criminal justice policies that are not rationally related to the goals of state punishment. Arational criminal legislation, however, is unlikely to further the penal goal of,
say, lowering crime rates simply because it is not designed to do so.
Maintaining crime's symbolic role of reaffirming community solidarity may even be inconsistent with reducing crime below a certain level. 2 ' It therefore should come as no surprise that the arational policy of mass incarceration of the past fifteen years or so,' 22
118. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
119. See United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1333-35 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
dissenting), aff'd, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
120. Thayer, supra note 48, at 155-56 n.1.
121. See DURKHEIM, supra note 111, at 108.
122. The incarceration rate has increased by roughly 150% since 1980, and by over
200% since 1973. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBooK, supra note 70, at 599. As of
June 30, 1995, the U.S. incarceration rate was the highest in the world. Myers, supra note
69. The U.S. prison population has tripled since 1980. Nearly 7% of Adult Black Men Were
Inmates in '94, Study Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 4, 1995, at A15 [hereinafter Black Inmates].
Between June 1994 and 1995, the prison population increased by 89,707 inmates, the largest
one-year increase ever. Myers, supra note 69.
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which the new recidivist laws continue, has done nothing to diminish crime in urban minority communities, which bear the brunt of
criminal violence in this country.12 Instead these communities now
find themselves not only with high rates of crime, but also with
124
high rates of incarceration among their young male constituents.
But one may resist the suggestion that anyone who is concerned about crime would take an approach toward the question of
crime and punishment that is unlikely to reduce crime. It certainly
is difficult to explain how a given person can at one and the same
time complain about high crime rates, affirm her commitment to
addressing the problem of crime, and support policies without considering their effect on the crime rate.
Arational attitudes toward state punishment make more sense
if one questions today's ubiquitous lamentations about exorbitant
crime rates. Arational policies of mass incarceration, for example,
appear quite sensible if one views them not as seeking to reduce
the crime rate or to give offenders their due, but as designed to
confine the effect of criminal and state violence to certain communities, in particular to prisons and to so-called high-crime urban
neighborhoods. If crime and punishment have merely symbolic significance, merely symbolic action against crime and criminals is entirely appropriate.
Seen in this light, the current criminal justice policies are the
rational means to symbolic ends. In fact, they emerge as a resounding success. Urban minority communities continue to experience
rates of crime significantly higher than those in predominantly
white suburban and rural communities.

25

At the same time, stag-

123. See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination:A
Comment, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (1994); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, PUB.No. NCJ-147005, CRIME AND NEIGHBORHOODS (1994) (by 1991, black households three times more likely than white households to cite neighborhood crime as serious
concern; neighborhood crime number one concern of black central city households) [hereinafter CRIeME AND NEIGHBORHOODS]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PUB.No. NCJ-147004, YOUNG BLACK MALE VICTIMS: NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY

(1994) (in 1992, young black males "experienced violent crime at a rate significantly higher
than the rates for other age or racial groups.").
124. See MARC MAUER & TRACY HULiNG, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER (The Sentencing Project 1995).
125.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

VICTMUZATION IN CITY, SUBURBAN, AND RURAL AREAS

(1992)

PUB.No. NCJ-13943,

(between

CRIME

1987 and 1989,

the

violent crime rate and the household crime rate among city dwellers was 92% and 93%,

respectively, higher than among rural residents and was 56% and 52% respectively, higher
than among suburban residents.); CRIME AND NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 123 (between
1985 and 1991, "[b]lack households.., have consistently had a higher percentage of violent
crime victimization as well as overall victimization" and "central city households were con-

sistently more likely to have experienced a violent crime than either suburban or rural

1995]

RECIDIVIST STATUTES

gering numbers of minority men are incarcerated, and the numbers
continue to rise.12 By 1990, about one quarter of black males in
their twenties were under some form of criminal justice control on
any given day (prison, jail, probation, parole). 27 Five years later,
this proportion had risen to almost one in three. 128 In 1991, fortytwo and fifty-six percent of black males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five were under criminal justice supervision in
Washington, D.C., and Baltimore, respectively.12 e As incarceration
rates among black men have risen steadily over the past decade,
they have remained fairly stable for white men. 30 By 1994, the
proportion of black men incarcerated nationwide was almost eight
times higher than that of white men. 131
In our ever-expanding prison society of, by last count, roughly
two million inmates and personnel, a predominantly white minority keeps a predominantly non-white majority in check. Almost
two-thirds of prison inmates are members of racial minorities,
while roughly three-fourths of prison employees are white. 13 2 This
discrepancy is likely to increase as new prisons appear in rural
communities throughout the country. For example, when the new
state prison in Potosi, Missouri, was recently built in the state's
poorest rural district, it immediately became the largest employer
of the overwhelmingly white population. By 1992, although about
half of Potosi's inmates were black, the prison had only one black
employee, a night guard, among its dozens of guards, nurses, doctors, counselors, and administrators."3 '
Once the policy of mass incarceration in the name of anticrime symbolism no longer appears quite so irrational, however,
the rationality deficit shifts from the relation between means and
ends to the ends themselves. A punishment practice designed to
quarantine crime is internally inconsistent insofar as it turns on
the exclusion of persons from the state community who are prehouseholds"; in 1991, 59% of blacks lived in "central cities," 27% in suburbs, and 14% in
the country, compared to 28%, 49%, and 23% or whites, respectively).
126. See CORAmAE R. MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR 220-54 (1993).
127. MARC MAUER, YOUNG BLACK MALES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GROWING NATIONAL PROBLEM (The Sentencing Project 1990).
128. MAUER & HULING, supra note 124.
129. TONRY, supra note 53, at 4; MAUER & HULING, supra note 124.
130. Black Inmates, supra note 122.
131. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. NCJ-158021,
STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS REPORT RECORD GROWTH DURING LAST 12 MONTHS (1995)
(6.8% of black men incarcerated, compared to less than 1% of white men).

132. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK, supra note70, at 94, 95; BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PuB. No. NCJ-151654, PRISONERS IN 1994 (1995).
133. STEPHEN TROMBLEY, THE EXECUTION PROTOCOL (First Run-Icarus Films 1992).
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sumed to be members of that community for purposes of assigning
criminal responsibility. Consider the symbolic view of crime and
punishment that underlies current punitive attitudes. On the one
hand is the symbol of crime. Crime here appears as an external
threat to the fabric of the community. Criminal offenders are alien
predators threatening the community's well-being from somewhere
beyond its walls, mysterious creatures whose life circumstances are
familiar to members of the beleaguered community mainly through
news reports on crime or through the intrusive cameras of real
crime shows depicting the protectors of the community ramming
their way into the homes of suspected drug dealers. On the other
hand is the symbol of punishment. Punishment asserts the community's readiness and willingness to defend itself and its members against all challenges from without. Punishment also reinforces the community members' sense of commonality by focusing
their collective wrath on an external threat to the community's
most fundamental norms.
Now the white suburb dweller or village inhabitant may well
experience crime mainly as a symbol of societal decay because she
lives in a low-crime area. She similarly may experience punishment
mainly as a symbol of societal resilience because it will primarily, if
not exclusively, affect individuals whom she does not consider
members of her community, in particular, residents of the very urban minority neighborhoods that suffer from the worst crime rates.
In sharp contrast, a resident of such a high-crime neighborhood
exleriences both crime and punishment as real and painful because the violence of crime and of punishment draws its victims
from her community. Because crime is more than a symbol to her,
she is far less likely to be content with a symbolic response to
crime. Because punishment is more than a symbol to her, she will
hesitate to endorse drastic and arbitrary punitive measures in the
name of symbolism.
The current policy of containing violence in minority communities therefore presumes the exclusion of these communities from
the community of state punishment. Only if members of the state
community consider the minority victims of criminal and state violence as outsiders, can the members of the state community countenance the infliction of violence on these persons1 3 4 and can their
punishment reaffirm the solidarity among members of the state
community. In other words, current criminal justice policy in the
United States solves the enlightenment problem of justifying the
134. Though, even in this case, the privatization of state punishment protects them
from the sight of its infliction.
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infliction of violence by the state on its self-determining members
by denying that the victims of that violence were members of the
state community in the first place. Criminal punishment therefore
becomes literally a war on crime waged against alien
135
communities.
The exclusion of certain members of the state community for
purposes of crime and punishment, however, is internally inconsistent. As I have argued elsewhere, the very act of assigning criminal
responsibility to a person presumes the inclusion of that person in
one's normative community.3 e We can subject a person to punishment-as opposed to vengeance-only if she is like us in the sense
that she is subject to the very norms that also govern our behavior.
To exclude a person from this community of blame is to free her of
criminal liability. In Benthamite terms, to deny her the benefit of
freedom from unjustified violence, even if she is a prison inmate, is
to diminish the well-being of the community.1 37 Obviously, if that
exclusion turns on racial characteristics, any attitude toward crime
and punishment that presumes it is not only internally inconsistent, but also racially discriminatory.
Aside from its internal inconsistency and racial discrimination,
an attitude toward crime and punishment that excludes certain
community members also does not obviate the need for rational
justification. As we saw earlier, even the violence of war requires
justification. The war on crime, as any war, always also inflicts violence on members of the state community, no matter how restrictively this community may be defined by current attitudes toward
crime and punishment. Victims of the war on crime also include
police officers, prison guards, and prison nurses. Moreover, violence
against outsiders is still violence against rational agents. Attempts
to deny the human rationality of minority persons in the public
discourse on crime and in our legal system are but attempts to
deny that state or criminal violence against minorities offends the
inhibition against inflicting violence on any rational being that has
been recognized since the enlightenment." 8'
135. Some proponents of the recent explosion of incarceration have argued that it is not
they but their opponents who ignore the violent reality of crime, in particular, the violence
reflected in the exorbitant crime rates of many urban minority communities. This argument
misses the point. The policies of massive incarceration-including the recent recidivist
laws-are not only irrational, and therefore unlikely to reduce crime in minority communities; they are also arational because their proponents no longer even suggest that they will
reduce crime or mete out proportional punishment based on just desert.
136. Markus D. Dubber, Rediscovering Hegel's Theory of Crime and Punishment, 92
MICH. L. REv. 1577, 1581-83, 1601-21 (1994).
137. JEasmy BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUuSHMENT 28 (1830).
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Today's arational discourse about crime and punishment has
lost sight of the need for the justification of state inflicted violence.
By focusing on the symbolic aspect of criminal punishment, proponents of the recent recidivist laws in effect denied that there was
any violence to be justified. Neither crime nor punishment, however, is ever merely symbolic. Each inflicts very real pain on actual
persons and, for that reason, requires more than a symbolic
justification.
In the end, therefore, arational punishment has an even more
pernicious effect than irrational punishment because it discards
the constraints which irrational punishment merely exceeds. Arational punishment precludes the rational debate necessary for the
emergence of a stable and considered consensus on crucial issues of
criminal justice policy. The symbolic ostracism of criminal offenders may foster a sense of community, at least among those who do
not expect that this ostracism could attach to a fellow member of
their community. But this benefit of exclusion comes at the price
of inconsistency, racial discrimination, and ineffectiveness.
To replace the current arational criminal lawmaking with a
considered debate about crime and punishment, at least two things
must be done. First, and most immediate, policymakers from the
referendum voter to the state legislator to the trial judge must
draw on the rational principles of state punishment to justify their
attitudes toward crime and punishment, their policy proposals,
and their sentencing decisions. Second, and most important, the
principled debate about state punishment in the United States
must proceed from the recognition that criminal offenders as well
as inhabitants of urban minority neighborhoods plagued by crime
are equal members of our normative community. As such they deserve equal protection against the arbitrary and irrational infliction
of state or private violence.
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